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 I. Introduction
 Equity for debt exchanges have recently experi-
 enced a surge in popularity. Before 1981, such trans-
 actions occurred occasionally, but because of a change
 in the tax laws, these transactions have since taken on
 new prominence. The financial press suggests that
 there are two main reasons for undertaking an ex-
 change: (1) to increase the current period earnings per
 share and (2) to improve the balance sheet by reducing
 debt.' The technique has been used by a broad cross-
 section of firms, and in certain cases, the earnings
 generated by the exchange have represented most of
 the earnings reported for the period.' These transac-
 tions are not without cost, since the firm may be re-
 placing a low cost source of funds with equity, and
 The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments and sug-
 gestions of the editor. Robert Taggart. and those of two anonymous
 referees.
 'See for example [1].
 2The Tax Reform Act of 1984 eliminated the favorable treatment of
 gains in an exchange; consequently, the transactions have been used
 infrequently since July 1984
 thereby, reducing interest tax shields. An equity-for-
 debt exchange may therefore represent a trade-off be-
 tween near term accounting benefits and longer term
 cash flow costs. An important question about these
 transactions is how this trade-off affects the value of
 the firm.
 The purpose of this paper is to address that question
 by examining the risk-adjusted returns of exchanging
 firms around the transaction date. We begin by dis-
 cussing the valuation implications of equity-for-debt
 exchanges,3 followed by a description of the sample of
 exchanging firms, and the empirical methods. Finally,
 we present the results of the analysis and concluding
 remarks.
 II. Valuation Implications
 A review of the press announcements of exchanges
 suggests that some managers undertook these transac-
 tions because of the immediate accounting changes
 that occur in the income statement and balance sheet,
 specifically, an increase in earnings for the current
 3Finnerty [8] provides a description of the institutional and tax details of
 exchanges.
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 period and a reduction in financial leverage. As with a
 discount bond repurchase, the gain on the transaction
 is the total amount of the discount on the bonds retired,
 and this gain may be reported as earnings.4 In the case
 of U.S. Steel, the gain amounted to $87 million in the
 second quarter of 1982, turning an $83 million loss
 into a profit of $4 million for the quarter. The balance
 sheet changes result from the reduction in the principal
 amount of outstanding debt, and an increase in equity
 by the amount of the newly issued shares plus the gain.
 While the financial press has focused on the benefi-
 cial accounting effects of equity for debt exchanges,
 the capital market reaction to an exchange might be
 positive or negative, depending on the perceived pur-
 pose of the transaction.5 For example, certain firms
 may have used the exchange to effect a permanent
 change in financial leverage, and in those cases, recent
 findings would suggest a permanent negative revalu-
 ation of the shares. Studies of capital structure change
 have documented a positive relationship between the
 change in equity value and the direction of the change
 in financial leverage,6 with the change attributed to a
 tax effect, a wealth transfer, or an information effect.
 Other firms used an exchange as part of a bond
 refunding strategy, in response to the Bankruptcy Tax
 Act. Kalotay [9] demonstrated that the profitability of
 a refunding decision depends on the avoidance or de-
 ferral of any associated tax liability. Following the
 change in the tax law, deferral was permitted when the
 bonds were exchanged for equity. Thus, a profitable
 equity for debt exchange might be expected to have a
 positive impact on the value of the firm's equity.7
 The announcement of an exchange could therefore
 lead to differing valuation effects across companies,
 with the direction of the change determined by the
 market's perception of the motivation for the transac-
 tion. A permanent negative revaluation would result if
 4There has long been concern over the treatment of the profit when firms
 retire discount bonds. The SEC has been concerned that the discount
 was being reported as ordinary rather than extraordinary income. Gener-
 ally, the gain is extraordinary if the scheduled maturity date is more than
 one year beyond the repurchase date.
 5Finnerty [8] presents an extensive analysis of the valuation conse-
 quences of equity for debt exchanges, providing the insights of an
 investment banker. A number of his observations were helpful in the
 development of this section.
 6See, for example Dann [5], Masulis [11], Mikkelson [15], and Ver-
 maelen [19].
 7The net effect is confounded by any negative valuation impact associat-
 ed with the reduction in long-term debt resulting from the transaction.
the firm were perceived as permanently reducing fi-
 nancial leverage. An upward revaluation would result
 from the perception that the firm was using the ex-
 change as part of a profitable bond-refunding strategy.
 The market's perception of the motivation for the
 exchange is crucial in the revaluation, and it is likely
 that this perception would be based upon information
 conveyed by the characteristics of each exchange. For
 example, a firm using the exchange as part of a refund-
 ing strategy could signal this information to the market
 by issuing debt prior to the announcement of the ex-
 change, or by using a combination of cash and equity
in the exchange.8 In contrast, a firm that wished to use
 the exchange to reduce financial leverage would be
 expected to use only equity in payment for the bonds,
 since the use of cash would moderate the impact on
 leverage.
 III. The Sample of Equity for Debt
 Exchanges
 The sample of transactions for this study includes
equity for debt exchanges in 1981 and 19829 by firms
 meeting the following criteria:
 (i) the firm's stock returns be available in the
 CRSP daily returns file. This limited the sam-
 ple to NYSE and ASE listed firms.
 (ii) the equity for debt exchange had an identifiable
 announcement date.
 (iii) no other major firm-specific events occurred
 within 20 trading days of the exchange.10
 8The use of cash in the exchange would provide a non-ambiguous signal
 that the firm was not altering its capital structure by the full amount of
 the exchange, since the use of cash would moderate the desired effect.
 We recognize that it is not necessarily true that the use of cash indicates
 that the firm will be refunding debt, however, we contend that this is a
 likely situation because of the favorable tax treatment of exchanges with
 regard to refunding. A possible alternative explanation for the use of
 cash would be when a firm was using the exchange as part of a sinking
 fund management program.
 9The first exchange, by Quaker Oats, was completed in August 1981.
 Our sample period thus extends from August 1981 through December
 1982.
 '0Two investments banking firms provided us with internal listings of
 all exchange transactions. From these lists, more than 200 transactions
 were initially identified. All of the original press announcements were
 read, and The Wall Street Journal Index was reviewed for 50 days
 before and after the announcement date to be certain that each transac-
 tion met these criteria. Firms were excluded when any confounding
 event occurred within that window. In a number of cases, the exchange
 was announced along with the periodic earnings. This was a primary
 cause of sample shrinkage. Examples of other confounding events in-
 cluded product liability litigation for Esmark, and an oil discovery by
 Phillips Petroleum.
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 The Wall Street Journal Index and the original Wall
 Street Journal articles were reviewed to make certain
 that each of the transactions met the preceding three
 criteria. These selection criteria resulted in a final sam-
 ple of 108 equity-for-debt exchanges undertaken by 90
 firms. In Exhibit 1, we present the relative size distri-
 bution of the transactions, where size is the number of
 shares exchanged as a proportion of the total shares
 outstanding. The cross-sectional variation is apparent.
 Three event-related dates were identified for each
 transaction. The date the first announcement of the
 exchange appeared in The Wall Street Journal is re-
 ferred to as the announcement date. The second date of
 interest is the date when the new shares were registered
 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
 defined as the filing date. Typically, the filing date
 preceded the announcement date by one or more trad-
 ing days. Finally, the pricing date is the day when the
 firm actually issues the new shares to the investment
 banker. The terms of the transaction are established by
 the market prices on that day, and any uncertainty
 about the transaction is resolved then. The pricing date
 was generally the last of the three dates, although there
 were some cases where it was coincident with the
 announcement date.
 In order to identify those firms in the sample using
 the exchange as part of a bond refunding program, we
 searched the Compuserve data base for new bond is-
 sues during the period January 1, 1981 through June
 30, 1983. This procedure allowed us to partition the
 sample into 34 exchanges where there was a new bond
 issue (the refunding group) and 74 exchanges where
 there was no new issue. The sample was further parti-
 tioned on the basis of the use of cash in the transaction.
 Transactions in which cash was used were included in
 the refunding group. T The selection criteria resulted in
 a final sample of 43 refunding exchanges, and 65 non-
 refunding exchanges.
 IV. Methodology
 Security returns are examined over an event period
 from 50 trading days before the announcement date
 (day 0) to 50 trading days after. The market model was
 estimated over the period from t= - 200 to t = - 51,
 Exhibit 1. Size Distribution of Transactions (Equity
 Exchanged as a Percentage of Outstanding Equity)
 S N
 S > .10 2
 .10 > S > .08 2 Maximum 14.80%
 .08 > S > .06 3 Minimum .03
 .06 > S > .04 6 Mean 2.10
 .04 > S > .02 26
 .02 > S > .00 69
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 and the ordinary least squares coefficient estimates are
 denoted as a and :. The prediction error for security j
 on day t is defined as
 PEj, = Rjt - (a& + /jRm),  (1)
 where
 Rj, = the rate of return for security j on day t, and
 R,, = the value-weighted return for the market
 portfolio on day t.
 For each trading day t, the average prediction error is
 N,
 PE, = /Nt, PE,,
 j=1
 (2)
 where
 N, = the number of securities with a prediction
 error defined on day t.
 The cumulative average prediction error through day T
 is defined as
 CPE,
 T
 E PE,.
 t= -50
 (3)
 The cumulative average prediction error over the inter-
 val from t, to t, inclusive is
 t2
 CPEtl,2 = PE,
 t =t
 (4)
 "The basis for this partition was the similarity in abnormal returns for
 the two groups. The 12 firms that used cash as part of the exchange had
 abnormal returns equal in magnitude and significance to those of the 33
 firms that issued new bonds. This similarity existed despite the fact that
 only two firms (three exchanges) were in both groups. To the extent that
 we were unable to identify firms that repurchased shares with bank
 borrowings, out partition is less than perfect.
 where the interval has length L = t - t, + 1, reflecting
 the requirement that t2 does not precede t,.
 The analysis of the significance of the PEj,'s and
 their cumulation over defined intervals uses the meth-
 odology of Dodd and Warner [7]. The test-statistic
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 employed is the mean standardized cumulative predic-
 tion error. For a specific interval Lj = Tj,...,T2j, this
 test-statistic is
 SCPEj= - (PEj/s)/VT2 - T,j + 1.
 t=Tlj
 sjt is defined as
 (Rmt_ Rm)2 ' /2 sj, s I+1/Dj +  D.
 , (Rt' ,.-R)J2
 t'=l
 (5)
 (6)
 where s2 is the residual variance for security j from
 the market model regression,
 Dj is the number of observations during the
 observation period,
 Rmt is the rate of return on the market index for
 day t,
 Rm is the mean rate of return on the market
 index during the estimation period, and
 Rmt, is the rate of return on the market index for
 day t' of the estimation period.
 For a portfolio of N securities, the test-statistic is
 N
 Z= s SCPE//- N, (7)
 j=l
 which follows a unit normal distribution since each
 standardized prediction error, PEjt/sjt, is assumed to
 follow a unit normal distribution in the absence of
 abnormal performance. The interval over which SCPEj
 is calculated, Lj, can be of equal or different length
 across securities. When the interval is equal, we ana-
 lyze security performance for all firms relative to one
 of the three event dates and refer to this as the 'event
 day' technique. The event day analysis may lead to
 cross-sectional inconsistency because of the multiple
 event dates, and the fact that uncertainty about the
 transaction is resolved over intervals that vary from
 firm to firm.12 In order to overcome this inconsistency,
 we also utilize an 'event interval' analysis, where Lj is
 firm specific.
 V. Results
 In Exhibit 2, we report the daily mean prediction
 '2For example, with the event day (day 0) defined as the announcement
 date, at day +3 some firms will be past their pricing day while others
 will not yet have reached that date.
 errors (PE) and the mean cumulative prediction errors
(CPE) for event days - 50 through + 50 for both the
 refunding and non-refunding groups. Exhibit 3 is a plot
 of the respective CPE's over the same period. The test-
 statistics for various intervals around the announce-
 ment date are reported in Exhibit 4. Two aspects of the
 CPE patterns are notable: the overall differences
 throughout the interval, and the similarity of the pat-
 terns at the initial event (day 0) for the transaction.
 A. Overall CPE Patterns
 The differences in the CPE patterns for the two
 groups are striking, with a total accumulation for the
 refunding group of 7.39% on day 50 compared to
 - 1.03% for the non-refunding group. In addition, the
 CPE for the non-refunding group is negative during
 most of the 101-day period of analysis, while that for
 the refunding group is mostly positive and generally
 increasing past day -20. The post-event accumula-
 tion for the refunding group was statistically signifi-
 cant for all except the shortest of the intervals reported.
 The results reported here are consistent with our earlier
 discussion, i.e., there is a positive price effect for the
 refunding group, and no significant post-event valu-
 ation effect for the non-refunding group.
 B. Announcement Period Effects
 Despite the differences in overall results, the reac-
 tion to the initial event is similar for the two groups. In
 each case the test-statistics in Exhibit 4 are significant
 and negative during the two-day event interval. The
 difficulty and importance of identifying the announce-
 ment date with precision in any event study is well
 known,'3 and is especially pertinent here since there
 were three key dates for each exchange, and any uncer-
 tainty over the terms of the exchange was not finally
 resolved until the pricing date. Generally, the initial
 press announcement followed the SEC filing by one or
 more days, creating the possibility that information
 about the transaction was available prior to the press
 date. In order to avoid this potential measurement
 problem, we define day 0 as the earliest of the press or
 filing date, and examine prediction errors on days - 1
 and 0.
 In Exhibit 5, we report the results of this phase of the
 analysis, and present the distributions of two-day
 CPE's for both groups. The CPE for the refunding
 group is - 1.29% (test-statistic -4.53), while that for
 '3See Brown and Warner [3].
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 Exhibit 2. Daily Prediction Errors (PE) and the Cumulative Prediction Errors
 (CPE) Around the First Announcement (Day 0) of Equity for Debt Exchanges
 Non-Refunding Firms Refunding Firms
 Day PE CPE Day PE CPE
 -50 -0.00150 -0.00150 -50 0.00213 0.00213
 -40 -0.00248 - 0.01200 -40 -0.00027 - 0.00569
 - 30 0.00062 -0.00500 - 30 0.00202 0.00227
 - 20 - 0.00095 -0.00324 - 20 0.00006 0.00098
 -10 -0.00311 -0.00594 -10 0.00461 0.01575
 - 9 - 0.00096 - 0.00498 - 9 - 0.00222 0.01353
 - 8 -0.00211 -0.00719 - 8 -0.00506 0.00847
 - 7 - 0.00057 - 0.00776 - 7 0.00285 0.01132
 - 6 -0.00296 -0.01072 - 6 -0.00252 0.00880
 - 5 0.00453 - 0.00637 - 5 0.00460 0.01340
 - 4 0.00238 - 0.00399 -4 - 0.00032 0.01308
 - 3 -0.00132 - 0.00531 - 3 0.00086 0.01394
 - 2 -0.00347 - 0.00878 - 2 - 0.00137 0.01256
 -1 -0.00002 -0.00880 - - 0.00432 0.00824
 0 -0.00599 -0.01479 0 -0.00864 -0.00040
 1 -0.00496 -0.01975 1 0.00062 0.00022
 2 - 0.00317 - 0.02292 2 0.00222 0.00244
 3 0.00189 -0.02103 3 -0.00054 0.00190
 4 -0.00213 -0.02316 4 0.00274 0.00464
 5 -0.00121 -0.02437 5 0.00202 0.00665
 6 0.00140 -0.02296 6 0.00291 0.00956
 7 0.00166 -0.02131 7 0.00280 0.01236
 8 -0.00042 -0.02173 8 0.00667 0.01903
 9 0.00226 -0.01947 9 0.00521 0.02425
 10 - 0.00428 - 0.02375 10 0.00108 0.02533
 20 0.00054 -0.01849 20 0.00162 0.03682
 30 -0.00145 -0.01556 30 0.00219 0.05238
 40 -0.00256 -0.00869 40 0.00275 0.05464
 50 -0.00095 -0.01026 50 0.00187 0.07394
 the non-refunding group is -0.6% (test-statistic
 -2.32), and the distributions of the CPE's for the
 groups are similar with 67% and 63% negative, respec-
 tively. Of the 108 transactions, 70 were associated
 with negative event interval prediction errors. These
 results provide strong evidence of the negative com-
 mon stock price reaction to the initial exchange an-
 nouncement. This result might be expected for the
 group using the exchange to reduce its financial lever-
 age, but it is puzzling for the refunding group which
 had such a strong positive price effect in the post-event
 period. For that group, the announcement causes a
 brief but significant discontinuity in the positive trend
 of the CPE's. This result raises a question about the
 cause of the similar negative responses to the an-
 nouncement for the two groups.
 C. Analysis of the Results
 Several possible explanations of the negative returns
 have been identified in previous studies. These include
 s pply effects, tax effect , wealth transfers between
 classes of security h lders, transaction costs, and in-
 formation effects. In this section, we use both direct
 and indirect tests to identify the factor(s) which actual-
 ly caused the decrease in value.
 Supply Effect. A possible explanation of the ex-
 cess retur s pattern observed in this study is the price
 pressure hypothesis discuss d by Scholes [18], Marsh
 [10], and recently, by Asquith and Mullins [2]. This
 hypothesis asserts that newly issued shares create a
 supply/d ma d imbalanc , causing the additional
 shares to be sold at a discount, and that the size of the
 disco nt is a positive function of the size of the issue.
 Equ ty for d bt exchanges ave characteristics similar
 to secondary distribu ions;'4 and, if the newly issued
shares did cause a supply imbalance, a pattern of re-
 '1Scholes reported the average proportion of the firm traded in his
 sample to be 0.0216; the average proportion of equity exchanged in our
 sample was 0.021
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 Exhibit 3. Plot of the Cumulative Prediction Errors
 for the Two Groups
 .08
 .06
 .04 -
 .02
 0 A
 -.02 --
 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10
 Refunding Firms
 0 10 20 30 40 50
 DAYS AROUND EVENT
 turns similar to that observed here might result.15
 Previous studies of the price pressure hypothesis
 have produced conflicting results. Neither Scholes nor
 Marsh found evidence to support the existence of a
 '5Copeland and Weston [4], p. 327, discuss the price pressure hypothe-
 sis, and present diagrams representing the shape of CPE patterns when
 price pressure exists. The diagrams are quite similar to the patterns in
 Exhibit 3.
 price pressure effect in studies of secondary issues and
 rimary issues, respectively. The recent study by As-
 quith and Mullins, however, reports a significantly
 negative relationship between the announcement day
 returns and the size of the equity offering, evidence
 consistent with a price pressure effect.
 To test this hypothesis, we examined the relation-
 ship between the event interval cumulative prediction
 0
 cr
 w
 z
 0
 C.)
 w
 cr
 a-
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 Exhibit 4. Test-Statistics for Various Intervals
 Around the Earliest Event
 with the Exchange
 Date (Day 0) Associated
 Non-Refunding Firms Refunding Firms
 Interval t-statistic Interval t-statistic
 -50 to 0 -1.117 -50 to 0 0.196
 -25 to 0 -0.954 -25 to 0 0.059
 -10to 0 -1.010 -10to 0 -1.584
 - 5to 0 -0.613 - 5to 0 -2.035
 - 1 to 0 -2.319 - 1 to 0 -4.529
 1 to 5 -2.355 1 to 5 1.330
 I to 10 -1.475 1 to 10 3.411
 1 to 25 0.495 1 to 25 3.520
 I to 50 -0.038 1 to 50 4.753
 error, and the relative size of each transaction. The
 two-day CPE was regressed on the size variable, and,
 following Scholes, on the natural log of size,16 for both
 the entire sample, and by refunding sub-group. In none
 of the regressions was there a statistically significant
 relationship between the size of a transaction and the
 CPE. This result is not consistent with the existence of
 a price pressure effect.
 Tax Effects. Mikkelson [15] has shown that the
 reduction in tax shield is a factor that helps explain the
 reduction in firm value associated with a decrease in
 financial leverage. The tax shield consequences of eq-
 uity-for-debt exchanges are affected by whether an
 offsetting reissue occurs; thus, the tax effect should
 differ from the refunding to the non-refunding group.
 We interpret the combination of differing tax conse-
 quences and similarity of announcement-period value
 changes as indirect evidence that the tax consequences
 of equity for debt exchanges do not explain the decline
 in value at the announcement. The lower level of inter-
 est tax shields could explain the permanent decrease in
 value exhibited by the non-refunding group after the
 announcement.
 Wealth Transfers. Although it seems unlikely
 that firms would undertake transactions that would
 transfer wealth from stockholders to bondholders, a
 leverage reducing equity for debt exchange has the
 potential to effect this transfer. A transfer in wealth
 could result from lower expected bankruptcy costs, a
 change in relative priorities of claims, and a reduction
 in variance of return to stockholders. To investigate the
 existence of a wealth transfer, the abnormal returns on
 senior securities of all exchanging firms were exam-
 '6The log of size was used because of the long right tail on the size
 variable.
 ined along with the comovement of returns on common
 stock and senior securities for individual companies. 7
 There was no evidence of a wealth transfer being asso-
 ciated with equity for debt exchanges.
 Transactions Costs. While transactions costs may
 have contributed to the decline in value observed at the
 announcement, they were not a major factor. The fi-
 nancial press reported transactions costs to be approxi-
 mately 3% of the value of equity exchanged, and the
 average percentage of equity exchanged in our sample
 was 2.10%. These figures suggest that, on average,
 transactions costs accounted for 0.0633% of the de-
 cline in equity value. Even for the largest exchange
 considered, in which 14.8% of the outstanding equity
 was swapped, the implied valuation consequence is
 only 0.444%.
 Information Effects. Information effects appear
 the most likely explanation for the negative reaction to
 the announcement. Since the transaction provided no
 real economic benefit to the firm, the announcement
 provided an ambiguous signal to the market. Those
 firms using an exchange to manufacture accounting
 earnings may have been perceived as having a limited
 investment opportunity set, while those using the ex-
 change as part of a sinking fund management program
 did not disclose that information at the announcement.
 The net effect for each may have been a negative
 reaction to the ambiguity surrounding the purpose of
 the transaction.
 VI. Summary
 Equity for debt exchanges became a popular trans-
 action in mid-1981, with more than 200 firms using the
 t chnique by the end of 1982. The financial press sug-
 gested that firms were using the exchanges to enhance
 earnings, and to reduce financial leverage ratios, there-
 by "cleaning up" their balance sheets. Investment
 bankers attributed the sudden popularity of exchanges
 to the passage of the Bankruptcy Tax Act, because that
 legislation foreclosed tax-deferred gains on bond re-
 fundings except when that refunding was accom-
 plished through an exchange.
 This paper examined the impact of equity-for-debt
 exchanges on stockholder wealth by analyzing abnor-
 mal returns around the announcement of the exchange.
 The sample of 108 exchanges was partitioned into two
 groups: those in which the bonds were refunded, and
 those where there was no apparent refunding. The
 '7See reference [17] for a complete description of the analysis.
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 Exhibit 5. Distribution of the Two-Day (-1,0) Common Stock Cumulative
 Prediction Errors for the Sample of Equity for Debt Exchanges
 Non-Refunding Refunding
 CPE N % N %
 CPE < -.08 0 0.00 2 4.65
 -.08 < CPE < -.06 0 0.00 1 6.98
 -.06 < CPE < -.04 4 6.15 2 11.63
 -.04 < CPE < -.02 13 26.15 10 34.88
 -.02 < CPE < .00 24 63.08 14 67.44
 41 29
 .00 < CPE < .02 16 87.69 10 90.70
 .02 < CPE < .04 5 95.39 2 95.35
 .04 < CPE < .06 3 100.00 1 97.67
 .06 < CPE 1 100.00
 24 14
 65 43
 Maximum .0554 .0653
 Minimum - .0482- .0957
 Mean -.0060 (Z= -2.32) -.0129 (Z = -4.53)
 firms that used the exchange as part of a bond refund-
 ing program had cumulative abnormal returns of
 7.39% on day 50, compared to cumulative abnormal
 returns of - 1.03% for those firms that did not refund
 the bonds.
 Despite the difference in post-event price changes,
 each group had significant negative abnormal returns
 at the announcement of the exchange. Possible causes
 of the negative reaction were examined, including a
 supply effect, tax effect, and transactions costs; how-
 ever, none of these were supported by the data. The
 evidence suggests that the price reaction at the an-
 nouncement was caused by uncertainty on the part of
 investors regarding the purpose of the exchange.
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